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THREE OBSTACLES TO THE PROMOTION OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY BY MEANS OF THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: The Sosa
Court's Incoherent Conception of the Law of Nations, the "Purposive" Action
Requirement for Aiding and Abetting, and the State Action Requirement for Primary
Liability

Michael Barsa and David Dana
Northwestern University School of Law1

I.

INTRODUCTION:
Plaintiffs have recently unearthed the 1789 Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) in

order to sue corporations for torts committed against aliens that violate “the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.” Most recent scholarship under the ATCA has
focused on positively delineating the contours of possible claims in light of history and
the norms of international law.2 In this Article, we take a different, more normative
approach—one that analyzes the doctrine in light of emerging principles of corporate
social responsibility.

1

We are grateful for the support of the Searle Center on Regulation, and for the
extremely helpful comments we received from participants at a roundtable at the Searle
Center.
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A great deal of the scholarship is devoted either to the inquiry into what claims are or
are nor permissible under the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa, see. e.g., Teddy
Nemeroff, Untying the Khulumani Knot:Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 40 COLUM HUM RIGHTS L REV 231 (2008), or to the
historical question of the original understanding or meaning of the ATCA, see., e.g.,
Jordan J. Paust, The History, Nature, and Reach of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 FLA J
INTL L 249 (2009).

The ATCA is a potentially powerful tool for foreign plaintiffs to challenge the
conduct of large, mostly US-based corporations in federal court. Such alleged conduct
ranges from torture to genocide to unauthorized medical experimentation to wholesale
environmental destruction. In response, corporate defendants and some scholars have
argued for strictly limiting actionable claims, while other scholars have argued for a
nearly universal jurisdiction, with fewer procedural safeguards, to try human rights and
environmental abuses in US courts.3
However, when seen in light of principles of corporate social responsibility, or
CSR, neither of these extreme positions appears tenable. CSR involves both substantive
pledges to ethical behavior as well as procedural calls for greater corporate transparency.4
As to the substantive issues, a too-narrow ATCA undermines CSR in several ways. Suits
under the Act can generate publicity regarding corporate activities that are contrary to the
corporation's public commitments. The imposition of liability by settlement or judgment,
even if it happen in only a relatively few cases, may also provide a strong financial
incentive for corporations to prevent future liability. As to the procedural issues, ATCA
suits may also lead to the discovery of new information not publicly known, effectively
policing corporate pledges to transparency.
Equally important is the danger that a too-broad ATCA might itself undermine
CSR. If (as some critics claim), plaintiffs may bring ATCA suits for essentially routine
3

The sharply divergent positions on the ATCA track differences in views as to the role of
international law and especially customary international law in the federal common law.
Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV L REV 815, 831-34
(1997) (arguing for no role for customary international law) with Ryan Goodman &
Derek Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common
Law, 66 FORDHAM L REV 463 (1999).
4
See Part __, infra.

natural resource extraction operations in a foreign nation, then the ATCA will not provide
any incentive for corporations to meet their stated CSR goals. From a CSR perspective,
the ideal ATCA legal framework would -- via both the imposition of adverse publicity
and liability and their non-imposition -- reward relatively "good" corporate actors and
punish relatively "bad" ones.5
In light of these concerns, we explore three obstacles to using the ATCA to
encourage CSR, each of which relates to a very active legal debate. The first obstacle
relates to what kinds of wrongdoing the ATCA makes actionable. The Supreme Court
has held that wrongful acts under the ATCA are not limited to what would have been a
violation of the law of nations in the late 18th Century. However it also warned courts to
be cautious when extending the reach of new claims and held that any new claims would
have to be defined with a “specificity comparable to” the “features” of the 18th-century
paradigms.6 The difficulty, from a CSR perspective, is that this formulation is both
ahistorical and incoherent, stifling the development of the “law of nations” in U.S. courts
and giving those courts virtually unfettered discretion to decline jurisdiction. This is
especially true in environmental cases, where courts have been extremely reluctant to
allow ATCA suits to proceed.7
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An analogous argument has been made in favor of requiring some wrongful intent as a
precondition for the imposition of corporate criminal liability under federal
environmental laws, rather than employing an essentially strict liability standard even in
the criminal context, as some commentators advocate and as some courts appear to
accept. See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO L J 2407 (1995)
(arguing for the integration of traditional criminal mes rea requirements withfederal
environmental law).
6
See infra xxxx.
7
For discussions of the treatment of environmental claims under the ATCA, see Pamela
Stephens, Applying Human Rights Norms to Climate Change: An Elusive Remedy, 21

Even if such suits could proceed in theory, there are additional obstacles to
actually holding corporations liable. Corporations often act in concert or in some
coordination with local government actors, and often it is the local government actor that
is directly involved in the alleged wrongdoing. In such cases, U.S. courts are split over
when the corporation may be held liable for aiding and abetting.8 Some require
purposive action and planned wrongdoing. Others require a lesser showing of corporate
knowledge. And some prominent commentators and business groups argue that the
ATCA does not allow for any aiding and abetting liability at all.9
We argue that the courts have broad discretion in fashioning an aiding and
abetting standard, and that the historical and normative arguments against any aiding and
abetting liability at all are weak. From a CSR perspective, a purposive action or planned
wrongdoing requirement has considerable appeal. That standard would allow a range of
cases of alleged wrongdoing to proceed to the discovery stage, while distinguishing
between relatively "good" and relatively "bad" corporate behavior.
The third obstacle relates to the state action requirement for ATCA liability.
According to some courts, any ATCA claim must involve alleged wrongdoing by foreign
state actors unless the alleged wrongdoing fits into a very narrow category of behavior
(most notably, genocide). Some courts, too, require that the foreign state actors
themselves acted knowingly or purposively. This requirement has the potential to

COLORADO J INTL L & POL 21 (2010); Natalie L. Bradgeman, Human Rights
Litigation Under the ATCA as a Proxy for Environmental Claims, 6 YALE HUM
RIGHTS & DEV L J 1 (2003)..
8
See Part ___, infra.
9
See infra xxxx. Indeed, some go even further and argue that the ATCA creates no
liability for corporations or no liability for anyone for acts committed outside the United
States. See, e.g., Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae, in Pfizer,
Inc. v. Abdullahi et al, No. 09-34 (
), at [ ].

prevent the ultimate imposition of liability upon any corporate actors who benefitted from
state action because proof of what the state actors knew or intended is often impossible to
obtain.10
Endorsing the approach recently embraced by the Second Circuit, we argue that
the state action requirement should be construed in a modest fashion, allowing suits to
proceed where state actors had only passive or no involvement in the alleged
wrongdoing. 11 This approach not only is desirable from a CSR perspective but also
heeds the U.S. Supreme Court’s warning that ATCA liability should not unduly implicate
the U.S. courts in issues of foreign relations and international politics.
In sum, we argue that, from a CSR perspective, it would be helpful for the
substantive scope of wrongdoing under the ATCA to include at least the most extreme
forms of endangerment of human health and the environment through environmental
contamination or degradation. In addition, it would be helpful for a low but significant
threshold to be broadly recognized for corporate aiding and abetting liability, and for the
state action requirement to be minimized or de facto discarded. The ATCA is often
regarded as a “human rights statute.” While there may not be a robust internationally
recognized right to a healthy environment as such,12 international conventions and basic
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Federal law -- including the rules of procedure -- make it possible to subpoena records
and witnesses located within the United States. Successfully executing a subpoena in a
foreign country, by contrast, depends on the legal agreements between the United States
and the foreign country and the foreign country's substantive law, and is notoriously
difficult, even regarding those foreign countries that have laws and a legal system that are
relatively similar to that of the United States.
11
See infra xxx.
12
A general right to a healthy environment is, however, enshrined in such documents as
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 24, 21 I.L.M. 58,
60, and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the

intuition suggest that death and devastation from environmental degradation are matters
of basic human rights. Establishing a legal framework under which such actions may
lead to liability would go a long way toward promoting international corporate CSR.

II.

A NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE ATCA
1.

HISTORY AND CONTOURS OF THE STATUTE

The ATCA is a deceptively simple statute. It reads in its entirety: “The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."13 As the
Supreme Court observed in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the ATCA is a “legal Lohengrin,"
and "no one seems to know whence it came.”14 Indeed, “[t]here is no record of
congressional discussion about private actions that might be subject to the jurisdictional
provision, or about any need for further legislation to create private remedies; there is no
record even of debate on the section.”15 Even today, “despite considerable scholarly
attention, it is fair to say that a consensus understanding of what Congress intended has
proven elusive.”16
Bereft of legislative history or much interpretive case law, the ATCA lay largely
dormant until 1980, when in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit upheld federal
jurisdiction over a claim that Americo Norberto Pena-Irala tortured and killed 17-year old

Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11(1), 28 I.L.M. 161. It also appears
in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and the 1992 Rio Declaration.
13
28 U.S.C. s 1350.
14
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (quoting IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519
F.2d 1001, 1015 (C.A.2 1975)).
15
Id. at 718.
16
Id. at 718-719.

Joelito Filartiga in retaliation for Filartiga’s father’s political activities.17 The fact that
both perpetrator and victim were citizens of Paraguay, and the alleged torture occurred in
Paraguay, did not dissuade the Second Circuit from asserting jurisdiction under the
ATCA. The Court held that: “In light of the universal condemnation of torture in
numerous international agreements, and the renunciation of torture as an instrument of
official policy by virtually all of the nations of the world (in principle if not in practice),
we find that an act of torture committed by a state official against one held in detention
violates established norms of the international law of human rights, and hence the law of
nations.”18 The Court noted that “[t]he law of nations ‘may be ascertained by consulting
the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and
practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.’”19
Citing numerous documents such as the United Nations Charter and the Declaration on
the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture,20 the Court had no trouble
concluding that torture violated the Law of Nations.
The question, after Filartiga, has been the extent to which other “established
norms” of international law rise to the level of the “Law of Nations” sufficient to confer
federal jurisdiction under the ATCA. For years, Courts were divided as to whether
evolving norms of customary international law could count, or whether the “Law of
Nations” should be interpreted as including only those international law offenses
cognizable at the time of the statute’s passage—most notably those offenses described in
17

See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (C.A.2 1980).
Id. at 880.
19
Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61, 5 L.Ed. 57
(1820)).
20
General Assembly Resolution 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N.Doc.
A/1034 (1975).
18

Blackstone’s Commentaries (violation of safe conduct, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy). In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, for example, Judge
Edwards argued that “it seems clear beyond cavil that violations of the ‘law of nations’
under section 1350 are not limited to Blackstone’s enumerated offenses,”21 while Judge
Bork argued just the opposite: that Congress, in drafting the “law of nations,” had in
mind only the offenses described in Blackstone.22
In Sosa, the Supreme Court endorsed a cautious, and muddled, middle-ground.
At the same time as the Court held that the ATCA was “a jurisdictional statute creating
no new causes of action,” it also held that “the common law would provide a cause of
action for the modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal
liability at the time.”23 These international law violations would not be limited to the
three primary offenses described by Blackstone, but those offenses would provide some
limit to what was actionable. According to the Sosa court, “courts should require any
claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features
of the 18th-century paradigms” of violation of safe conduct, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy.”24 In other words, while evolving norms of international law
could constitute the “law of nations” for ATCA purposes, such norms would have to be

21

See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 813-814. For a response to Judge Bork’s “originalist” interpretation, see William
S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
“Originalists” 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 238 (“Not only did the
members of the First Congress understand that the law of nations had evolved, they
expected that evolution to continue -- indeed, they specifically provided for it”).
23
See 542 U.S. at 724.
24
See 542 U.S. at 725.
22

“defined with a specificity comparable to” the three paradigm cases described by
Blackstone.
What exactly this compromise standard requires is less-than-clear, and its
ambiguity has allowed scholars and commentators to offer widely divergent views on
which norms are actionable and which are not. The contour of this debate as it relates to
environmental claims is taken up in Part __ infra. This debate has largely taken the form
of a positive, doctrinal discussion concerning what offenses do or do not violate the “Law
of Nations” based on the degree of specificity and universality of the norm at issue.
What is missing from this analysis is any normative focus. What should the “Law of
Nations” look like? The current ambiguity and fluidity of the doctrine makes this a prime
moment to ask—and begin to answer—this question.

2.

THE CORPORATE FOCUS

The myopic focus on positively delineating the contours of the doctrine has led
many scholars to ignore how the ATCA is actually used. Much of the current focus of
ATCA litigation is on multi-national corporations’ activities in developing countries.
ATCA claims have been brought over allegations that corporations aided and abetted
genocide by hiring and supervising members of the army to protect a natural gas
pipeline,25 aided and abetted human rights abuses in the course of constructing an oil
pipeline,26 conducted unauthorized medical experimentations on children, leading to

25

Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), dismissed as stipulated by the
parties in 403 F.3d 708.

26

numerous deaths,27 and aided and abetted human rights abuses by the Government of the
Sudan related to the development of oil concessions.28
Such ATCA litigation directly implicates corporate behavior in regimes—such as
developing countries—where local restrains on such behavior are both minimal and
easily malleable. In Nigeria, for example, the Petroleum Act—the primary law
governing Nigeria’s oil industry—contains vague requirements that oil companies’
actions must be conducted in accordance with “good oil field practice.”29 It is perhaps no
surprise to find well-documented environmental and human rights abuses in connection
with Nigerian oil development.30 Even when there are more stringent standards, Nigerian
state agencies have failed to adhere to them, and “[d]espite the glaring presence of oil
pollution, there is yet to be any enforcement action by any of the regulatory agencies.”31
What litigation under the ATCA often seeks to do, in other words, is to enforce
legal norms of behavior above and beyond the enforced law of the host country. It
should come as no surprise that corporate actors—the prime beneficiaries of lax local
laws—have been among the most vociferous opponents of broad ATCA jurisdiction, or
that some commentators have referred to ATCA litigation as “judicial imperialism.”32
Corporations have traditionally sought maximum freedom to pursue profits,

27

Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 77 F.App’x 48 (2d Cir. 2003).
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman, (2d Cir. 2008)
29
See Engobo Emeseh, et al., Corporations, CSR and Self-Regulation: What Lessons
From the Global Financial Crisis? 11 GERMAN L.J. 230, 244 (2010).
30
Human Rights Watch, The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights
Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities (1999).
31
See Engobo Emeseh, et al., Corporations, CSR and Self-Regulation: What Lessons
From the Global Financial Crisis? 11 GERMAN L.J. 230, 245 (2010).
32
See, e.g., Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, AWAKENING THE
MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 at 45 (2003); see also Robert Bork
“Judicial Imperialism,” Wall St. J., June 17, 2003, at A16.
28

unencumbered by legal rules. This is simply a result of corporate attempts to reduce the
costs of production in order to compete in the global market. As Herman Daly has put it:
“Costs to the firm are reduced by low pollution control standards, low worker safety
standards, low wages and standard of living for workers, and, among others, low health
care standards.”33
At the same time, however, many major corporations have begun to adopt
voluntary codes of conduct under the rubric of “Corporate Social Responsibility,” or
“CSR,” in order to demonstrate a commitment to values beyond profit. In fact, many of
the same corporations that are defendants in major ATCA cases alleging human rights or
other abuses are self-professed leaders in CSR. Chevron, for example, as successor to
Unocal after merger, states that “corporate responsibility is more than just an objective”
but is “central to everything we are and is embedded in everything we do.”34 Chevron’s
2008 Corporate Responsibility Report details numerous global initiatives to mitigate the
environmental harm of its projects and improve the lives of indigenous peoples. In terms
of human rights, Chevron has published a “Human Rights Statement” in which it declares
its support for human rights, acknowledges that companies “can play a positive role” in
contributing to human rights, and pledges to “work actively to conduct our global
operations in a manner consistent with human rights principles applicable to business.
This includes recognizing and respecting the relevant ideals expressed in the Universal

33

See Herman E. Daly, Problems with Free Trade: Neoclassical and Steady-state
Perspectives, in Zaelke et al., ed., TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW, ECONOMICS AND
POLICY 147-148 (1993).
34
Chevron 2008 Corporate Responsibility Report, “Developing Partnerships,” at:
http://www.chevron.com/globalissues/corporateresponsibility/2008/documents/Chevron_
CR_Report_2008.pdf

Declaration of Human Rights.”35 ExxonMobil, too, has declared its support of human
rights, environmental protection, biodiversity, and Standards of Business Conduct that
are “consistent with the spirit and intent of the United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights….”36 Royal Dutch Shell, sued for alleged human rights abuses in Nigeria,
incorporates human rights and social responsibility “as an integral part of its corporate
governance” including “the establishment of a Social Responsibility Committee that
reports directly to the board.”37
In addition to these commitments to substantive values such as human rights and
environmental protection, corporations at the heart of ATCA litigation have made
pledges to more procedural CSR goals such as promoting transparency in the way they
conduct business. Shell, for example, has become part of the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative and has supported the Transparency International Business
Principles on Countering Bribery and the Principles for Countering Bribery (PACI).38 In
its 2008 Report on Revenue Transparency of Oil and Gas Companies, Transparency
International labeled Shell a “high” performer in terms of revenue transparency (while
ExxonMobil was a “low” performer).39

35

See Chevron’s “Human Rights Statement,” at:
http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/chevronhumanrightsstatement.pdf
36
See ExxonMobil 2008 Corporate Citizenship Report, at 42
(http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/Imports/ccr2008/pdf/community_ccr_2008.pdf).
37
See Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the
Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635, 657
(2004).
38
See Article 13 Case Study of Shell, at http://www.article13.com/UNGC/Shell%20anticorruption%20case%20study.pdf
39
See Transparency International, 2008 Report on Revenue Transparency of Oil and Gas
Companies, at 15. Revenue transparency refers to public disclosure of payments to
governments, of financial information pertaining to operations (such as production costs)
and the existence of anti-corruption programs. Id. at 10.

Given these avowed corporate commitments to many of the very norms at stake in
ATCA litigation, one might ask why corporations have fought so hard against recognition
of these norms as legally binding rules. “[W]hile there appears to be some consensus
about the concept, with companies themselves adopting voluntary codes espousing their
commitment to the core principles of CSR, there has, however, been a strong resistance
to a binding regulatory code for the activities of [Multi-national Corporations].”40 Of
course, the corporate commitments may simply be for public relations purposes alone.
Some vociferous critics of CSR “charge that CSR is mere ‘window-dressing,’ or empty
rhetoric that exists mainly for public relations or marketing purposes, allowing companies
to reap the rewards and some business benefits of having a good CSR reputation without
keeping CSR promises or bearing the investment costs of doing so.”41
But even if CSR reflects sincerely held policies, corporations might nonetheless
be averse to facing damages risks whenever such policies have been breached. This
aversion may be heightened by the fact that only corporations subject to personal
jurisdiction in the United States are subject to the ATCA. Thus, U.S.-based corporations
may fear a competitive disadvantage if they are made liable for actions that companies
with no U.S. presence, devoid of such legal strictures, remain free to take.42 In addition,
corporations may be wary of the evolution of legally binding norms beyond their current

40

See Engobo Emeseh, et al., Corporations, CSR and Self-Regulation: What Lessons
From the Global Financial Crisis? 11 GERMAN L.J. 230, 237 (2010).
41
See Joe W. Pitts III, Corporate Social Responsibility: Current Status and Future
Evolution, 6 RUTGERS J. OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY 334, at FN145-146 (2009).
42
On the other hand, other nations have already incorporated various Customary
International Law principles into their national law. Australia, for example, recently
passed laws allowing for criminal prosecutions for international law violations such as
genocide. See Joanna Kyriakakis, Australian Prosecution of Corporations for
International Crimes, 5. J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 809 (2007).

commitments to CSR—an evolution that would be largely outside their control.
Customary International Law is not a static field.43 Today’s legitimate business decision
may be tomorrow’s human rights abuse.
Despite these fears, numerous scholars have called for far broader federal court
jurisdiction to try human rights and environmental abuses. One of the key questions has
been the extent to which environmental claims are cognizable as violations of Customary
International Law. The consensus appears to be that environmental claims are cognizable
violations, although significant barriers preclude many such claims.44 The task of some
scholars has been to overcome such barriers by developing a notion of environmental
“rights” that may either fit into existing Customary International Law norms or become
developed into their own norms of universal application.45
Again, whether these scholars are correct as a matter of positive law is not the
focus of this paper. Instead, we take a more normative view, using corporate CSR

43

See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 102-367
at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86) (noting that the ATCA "should
remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the
future into rules of customary international law"); Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, § 702 cmt. a (1987) (noting that § 702's list of the
customary international law of human rights "is not necessarily complete, and is not
closed").
44
See Richard Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses under the Alien Tort Claims Act:
A Practical Assessment 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 545, 551 (2000) (“Although customary
international law as applied through ATCA is sufficiently broad to permit some suits for
environmental harms, plaintiffs face many obstacles”); Russell Unger, Note, Brandishing
the Precautionary Principle Through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 638,
647 (2001) (noting that "district courts that have heard environmental claims under the
ATCA agree that the statute may apply to international environmental torts.").
45
See, e.g., Neil A. Popovic, In Pursuit of Environmental Human Rights: Commentary on
the Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, 27 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 487, 515 (1996); Sarah M. Morris, The Intersection of Equal and
Environmental Protection: A New Direction for Environmental Alien Tort Claims after
Sarei and Sosa, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 275 (2009).

commitments as our starting point to ask what sort of ATCA regime would foster
improved CSR—and hence improved environmental and human rights measures “on the
ground” in developing countries. As some scholars have put it, “one of the challenges of
using the concept of CSR in effectively promoting corporate accountability so far has
been the absence of a binding regulatory framework….”46
While many corporations favor voluntary CSR commitments alone, a legal
regime with some binding rules would certainly be an improvement. For one thing,
legally binding rules might reveal whether companies are serious about CSR or simply
using it as a public relations ploy. Even if companies are honestly committed to CSR,
legally binding rules may work to overcome the classic collective action problem that
arises when no individual corporation has an incentive to bind itself to a given norm if
other corporations are free to ignore it. Thus, legally binding rules may “push”
companies to adopt more robust commitments—and to add commitments not previously
adopted. This would have the effect, according to some scholars, of “restor[ing] what is
presently an unequal bargaining power in which [multi-national corporations] enjoy
substantially more leverage over the environmental policies of developing countries.”47
But the effects would likely go far beyond such “fairness” rationales. A more
robust ATCA would also “level the playing field” so that corporations—at least those
subject to U.S. jurisdiction—are not forced to compete on the basis of lax human rights
and environmental protections. Even though, as noted infra, the ATCA would not apply
to all corporations—limited as it is by U.S. personal jurisdiction—and thus would not
46

See Engobo Emeseh, et al., Corporations, CSR and Self-Regulation: What Lessons
From the Global Financial Crisis? 11 GERMAN L.J. 230, 237 (2010).
47
See James Boeving, Half Full…Or Completely Empty?: Environmental Alien Tort
Claims Post Sosa v. Alvarex-Machain 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 114 (2005).

preclude at least some corporations from skirting the rules, U.S. personal jurisdiction is at
least expansive enough to capture many if not most of the largest multi-national
corporations in the natural resource extraction industries that lie at the heart of the
associated environmental problems in developing nations.48 Even beyond the natural
resource extraction industries, “there are over 37,000 [multi-national corporations]
worldwide, almost all of which are based in or do business in the United States, thus
subjecting themselves to the jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts.”49 Thus, legally binding
rules in the U.S. would likely promote economic efficiency by forcing corporations to
lower costs through efficiency improvements rather than through externalizing costs—
such as environmental and human health costs—onto others in the form of lax
standards.50 Even among those companies with the strongest voluntary CSR

48

While many of the largest oil companies in the world (measured in terms of
production) are state-owned entities, the multi-nationals operating in developing countries
are almost all subject to U.S. jurisdiction. See ____. Moreover, to the extent that firms
subject to US jurisdiction might hesitate before investing in countries where human rights and
environmental abuses are unavoidable, this only provides an added incentive to those countries to
improve their human rights and environmental practices. Even if companies not subject to US
jurisdiction do step in, the resulting financial benefit to the host country will likely be lower due
to reduced competition stemming from the absence of firms that are subject to US jurisdiction.
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See Boeving, supra, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. at 146.

50

See Daly, supra, at 156-157 (“Competition can reduce prices in two ways: by
increasing efficiency, or by lowering standards. The lower standards refer to the failure
to internalize social and environmental costs.”). While this efficiency rationale appears most
salient in cases where location is easily changed (e.g., manufacturing), it also certainly plays a
role in natural resource extraction, where the location of the operation is tied to the location of the
particular resource. Unless the resource is scarce, firms often have a choice of locating in either
high-standards or low-standards jurisdictions. The oil extraction industry is a good example. Oilextraction leases in the United States often go unexploited, in part because of the high cost of
extraction relative to developing countries.

commitments, binding rules—and the concomitant ability to conduct discovery—may
lead to more effective monitoring and enforcement of whether those commitments are
actually being carried out.
One potential criticism would be that efforts to strengthen legally binding rules
would simply push companies to funnel their local operations through local
subsidiaries—ones beyond the purview of the U.S. courts—even if such local entities do
not yet exist. However, such fears are easy to overstate and are often not empirically
born-out. For example, “contrary to the predictions of academics and industry observers,
major oil companies have not systematically contracted out the shipping of their oil [in
response to heightened levels of liability]. In fact, these companies have moved in the
opposite direction, now transporting more crude oil in U.S. waters (both as a percentage
and in absolute terms) than they did before the heightened liability imposed in the wake
of the Exxon Valdez accident.”51 Even if corporations do try to contract out their
operations, U.S. courts have long experience at “piercing the corporate veil” in
appropriate situations. This is especially salient because, while local subsidiaries already
operate in many developing countries, the real decision-making is often centralized in the
parent company.52
Thus, it seems undeniable that a more robust ATCA regime will have some effect
on multi-national corporations (i.e., that corporations will not be able to contract around
the law), and that, from a CSR perspective, there would at least be some improvement if
there were some marginal strengthening of legally binding norms. A narrow regime—
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one that leads to the least amount of liability, minimizing binding rules in favor of purely
voluntary efforts—has its obvious flaws. At the very least, minimizing liability
minimizes the financial incentive for corporations to adopt robust CSR commitments,
exacerbates environmental and human health externalities, and minimizes the ability of
private parties to police corporate pledges.
There is, therefore, a strong case that at least some enhancement and expansion of
the legally binding norms under the ATCA would foster improved CSR.53 As a doctrinal
matter, courts could either incorporate procedural CSR considerations such as
transparency—for example, by stripping away any legal sanction gotten by means of
bribery, or by making bribery itself actionable if it causes harm—or enforce substantive
rules against major environmental harm. Courts could enforce a basic right to life, which
could be violated through environmental harm just as it could be violated through direct
action such as murder.54 Courts could even go further, enshrining some limited right to a
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healthy environment based on international legal principles that ban extreme
environmental abuses such as widespread, long-term, and severe environmental
damage.55 Other principles such as the prohibition against genocide and the prohibition
against racial discrimination might also include environmental elements.56 Eventually,
general international environmental norms such as the Precautionary Principle or
Sustainable Development may develop a set of more concrete rules.57 As one scholar has
put it, “international environmental law remains in its infancy and lacks similar
opportunities and motivating forces for substantive development [as human rights law].
Human rights law was not only fueled by the horrors of World War I and II and had
substantial time to develop internationally before being substantially integrated into U.S.
litigation, but it was also free of the positivist limitations” discussed in cases such as
Sosa.58 Thus, while international environmental law, in its current incarnation, exists
largely as a set of nascent principles, there is much room for it to grow and expand over
time, if given the chance.
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The lack of any clear statutory “plain meaning” or unambiguous legislative
history behind the ATCA means that efforts to expand the “Law of Nations” to
encompass evolving norms of international environmental law—and many of the
procedural and substantive elements of CSR—would not automatically be beyond the
power of the courts. The precise contours of how the ATCA should evolve in this respect
are beyond the scope of this paper—and will likely be the subject of years of litigation,
assuming courts allow it to happen. Given the normative justifications for at least some
marginal expansion of the doctrine, we argue that courts ought to allow some more robust
set of environmental claims to be actionable under the ATCA. In other words, they ought
to allow the “Law of Nations” under the ATCA to evolve with—and in turn shape—
evolving norms of international environmental law. This will only serve to strengthen
CSR commitments “on the ground” in developing countries, especially among the natural
resource extraction industries, where CSR is inextricably bound up with environmental
protection.
There are, however, numerous obstacles to the evolution of the ATCA in ways
that would promote CSR. These obstacles—three of which we explore in this paper—
serve to undermine the extent to which corporations may be held liable—or at least face
the threat of serious litigation—under the law. Before the ATCA may lead to improved
CSR—either by providing incentives to avoid international law violations or by actually
incorporating CSR tenets into international law—these obstacles must be addressed.

III.

OBSTACLE 1: AN AHISTORICAL AND INCOHERENT “LAW OF
NATIONS”

The first obstacle relates to what kinds of wrongdoing the ATCA makes
actionable. As described supra, the Supreme Court in Sosa has held that wrongful acts
under the ATCA are not limited to what would have been a violation of the law of
nations in the late Eighteenth Century. However it also warned courts to be cautious
when extending the reach of new claims. This has left the federal courts hopelessly
confused—in some cases allowing ATCA actions to proceed on the basis of alleged
wrongdoing that clearly would not have been regarded as problematic by Congress in the
late 1700s, while in other cases rejecting such expansion. Most saliently for our
purposes, the question of whether substantive CSR principles such as avoiding
environmental harm—or procedural principles such as transparency—may give rise to a
“law of nations” violation remains highly tenuous and uncertain. At least some of the
difficulty with extending the “law of nations” to CSR principles resides in the Supreme
Court’s formulation of the “law of nations” as being bound to the 18th century paradigms
at the same time it is not bound. Courts are left with the unenviable—and in some cases
impossible—task of deciding whether norms are “defined with a specificity comparable
to the features of the 18th-century paradigms.”
It is not even clear what this formulation requires on its face. For example, what
exactly are the “features” of the 18th century paradigms to which a court must compare
the “features” of a modern norm? The Supreme Court in Sosa announced that “federal
courts should not recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of
any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized
nations than the historical paradigms familiar when §1350 was enacted.”59 There seem to
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be two issues that arise from this formulation: one of acceptance and one of content. The
“universal acceptance” feature is akin to that described by Blackstone, who wrote that the
“law of nations” was considered to be “a system of rules, deducible by natural reason,
and established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world.”60 Of
course what constituted “universal acceptance” among “civilized” nations was much
narrower in the 18th century than it is today. Yet today, as then, such universal
acceptance is evidenced by treaties, court decisions, custom, and the works of scholars.61
At that level of generality, the requirement of universal acceptance is fairly
uncontroversial. However the Sosa Court, when applying this requirement, essentially
collapsed it into the second requirement: that of definiteness or specificity. In Sosa
itself, the plaintiff, Alvarez, had provided a survey of national constitutions and other
authorities for the proposition that “arbitrary” detention violated the Law of Nations.62
The Supreme Court dismissed these authorities by stating that the “survey does show that
many nations recognize a norm against arbitrary detention, but that consensus is at a high
level of generality.”63 While the Court noted that some extremely prolonged arbitrary
detentions might violate the Law of Nations, “it may be harder to say which policies
cross that line with the certainty afforded by Blackstone’s three common law offenses.”64
In sum, the court held that “[w]hatever may be said for the broad principle Alvarez

60

See William Blackstone, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 66.
542 U.S. at 734 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S., at 700).
62
See 542 U.S. at 736 n.27.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 737.
61

advances, in the present, imperfect world, it expresses an aspiration that exceeds any
binding customary rule having the specificity we require.”65
The general mode of analysis here is clear: until a modern norm reaches some
level of certainty or specificity “comparable” to the 18th century paradigms, no cause of
action will lie. What this assumes, however, is that the Law of Nations in the 18th
century was itself specific and certain. This assumption is of course not logically
required. A mere requirement of “comparable” specificity does not by itself imply
anything about the degree of specificity of the things being compared. Instead it derives
from how the Supreme Court formulated the inquiry, essentially conflating the need for
“specificity” with the need for a high degree of “certainty.” The Supreme Court’s
analysis clearly suggested that there was a high degree of “certainty” afforded by
Blackstone’s description of the Law of Nations, and that until a modern norm reached a
similar level of certainty, there could be no modern violation.
This assumption, however, is misplaced. Blackstone himself suggested that while
the Law of Nations was in a general sense immutable, it was as a practical matter neither
fixed nor certain and could be modified according to the necessities of the case. In
Blackstone’s words, all criminal offenses, of which offenses against the law of nations
was part, “should be founded upon principles that are permanent, uniform, and universal;
and always conformable to the dictates of truth and justice, the feelings of humanity, and
the indelible rights of mankind: though it sometimes (provided there be no transgression
of these eternal boundaries) may be modified, narrowed, or enlarged, according to the
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local or occasional necessities of the state which it is meant to govern.”66 In other words,
the “features” of the 18th century paradigms were meant to be universal, derived from
natural law, but not necessarily static over time or uniformly applied across nations. The
“law of nations” was thus part of the English common law tradition, under which judges
molded general principles to the particular circumstances of the case.67 It was not
reducible to something akin to statutory codes. In the words of Justice Story in U.S. v.
Smith, a case cited by the Sosa majority, “[o]ffenses, too, against the law of nations,
cannot, with any accuracy, be said to be completely ascertained and defined in any public
code recognized by the common consent of nations.”68
In other words, while the Supreme Court in Sosa acknowledged that Customary
International Law might evolve over time, it tried to anchor that evolution in a false sense
of the “certainty” of the law of nations as it had been recognized under the 18th century
natural law tradition. Contrary to the court’s assumption, the law of nations was meant to
be somewhat fluid and evolving from the very beginning. As one scholar has pointed
out, “[t]he Founding Generation also expected the law of nations to evolve through
decisions by common-law courts as cases were brought before them. The Continental
Congress recognized this when it recommended ‘to the several states to erect a tribunal in
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each State, or to vest one already existing with power to decide on offences against the
law of nations, not contained in the foregoing enumeration.’”69
In the context of the ATCA, the hunt for certainty is no doubt driven by the sheer
multiplicity of possible sources of the “law of nations,” and a concern that “activist”
judges might use the general principles espoused in those sources to hold corporations
liable for actions that the corporations did not expect would lead to liability, because
those actions were never specifically enumerated as offenses. In other words, the more
specifically the offense must be defined, the less power the judiciary has to “create” new
offenses. The Supreme Court acknowledged as much when it warned that the rule
Alvarez sought in that case would “create an action in federal court … for the violation of
any limit that the law of any country might place on the authority of its own officers to
arrest.”70 But apart from the specifics of the claim before the Court, as a general matter
the natural law tradition that gave birth to the ATCA was one in which judges did have
power—not to “create” new offenses but, as Blackstone makes clear, to “declare” how
the offenses were to be applied in a given case.71
There is of course an argument that making rulings pursuant to this conception of
natural law, as reflected in federal common law, has been unavailable to the federal
courts since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.72 The Supreme Court itself cautioned that “a
more expansive common law power” related to the ATCA “might not be” consistent with
69
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Erie.73 At the same time, however, the Supreme Court acknowledged that some common
law power does remain in the federal judiciary: “We think it would be unreasonable to
assume that the First Congress would have expected federal courts to lose all capacity to
recognize enforceable international norms simply because the common law might lose
some metaphysical cachet on the road to modern realism.”74 Where precisely is the line
between a common law power consistent with Erie and a common law power
inconsistent with that case is left largely to the imagination. Certainly Erie itself did not
announce any principle by which courts could develop some limited set of common law
norms.75 Courts are left to grapple with the fact that the law of nations (and its modern
incarnation in Customary International Law) incontrovertibly belongs to the common law
tradition,76 yet at the same time, courts are cautioned that the common law development
of the law of nations remains beyond the purview of U.S. courts unless and until some
arbitrary threshold of “specificity” is crossed.
The arbitrary nature of the specificity inquiry is only highlighted by the
essentially standard-less task it sets out for the courts. What level of “specificity” is
“comparable” to, for example, the offence of piracy, which Blackstone claims “consists
in committing those acts of robbery and depradation upon the high seas, which, if
committed upon land, would have amounted to felony there”?77 As an analytical
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exercise, this question seems impossible to answer in any remotely objective way. For
example, some scholars have attempted to delineate the salient features of piracy, setting
forth the features that seemed to animate the Sosa court.78 Along these lines, such
scholars argue that Sosa’s historical test may put most if not all modern human rights
offenses beyond the purview of the courts.79 Yet the Sosa court itself, at least
rhetorically, would not go this far.80 What, then, does Sosa require? It appears that what
the Sosa standard accomplishes—akin to the “political question” and other doctrines
discussed infra—is to give courts a free-wheeling basis to deny jurisdiction: to give
courts virtually unchecked discretionary power to decline to hear a case. Whether such
discretionary powers are consistent with the Constitution is not the focus of this paper.81
Our point is simply that the fundamentally incoherent nature of the “law of nations”
inquiry—one where courts must anchor the “law of nations” in certain 18th century
paradigms while simultaneously ignoring the way those paradigms were understood at
the time—has become a serious impediment to using the ATCA to strengthen corporate
environmental CSR.
This is not to say that judges should be free to adopt whatever positive legal
standards they wish, so long as it arguably comports with some sweet-sounding general
principle such as “precaution” or “sustainable development.” Between the specificity
straightjacket and the tempting promiscuity of judicial whim lies a middle-ground that
78
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has long been occupied by courts: that of the gradual accretion of norms and standards
that develop through ever more-contextualized interpretations to guide future courts.
Such a task is certainly more daunting in the international context, but it is by no means
impossible. Our claim in this paper is simply that such a process should not be thwarted
or made overly onerous by imposing incoherent standards that allow courts to decline
jurisdiction in virtually any case.
Indeed, court decisions thus far have born-out the fear that the “law of nations”
test that was crystallized by the Sosa court may leave precious little room for the sort of
evolution contemplated by the drafters of the statute. Certainly in the environmental
context, courts have declined jurisdiction in many cases by adopting a quite narrow view
of how specific the “law of nations” must be before an action will lie. In Amlon Metals,
Inc. v. FMC Corp., for example, which was “the first case to squarely address
international environmental law in the context of the ATS,”82 the district court held that
the plaintiffs, suing over an international shipment of hazardous waste under the
Stockholm Principles, held that these principles did not “set forth any specific
proscriptions, but rather refer only in a general sense to the responsibility of nations to
insure that activities within their jurisdictions do not cause damage to the environment
beyond their borders.”83
Later cases have largely followed this pattern. In Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran,
the Fifth Circuit, in response to a claim of environmental damage that included hollowing
mountains, stripping forests, and polluting rivers, held that the “sources of international
law cited by Beanal and the amici merely refer to a general sense of environmental
82
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responsibility and state abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernable
standards and regulations to identify practices that constitute international environmental
abuses or torts.”84 In Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, the Central District of California, in
response to claims of widespread environmental damage, including deaths, from the
defendant’s mining operations, held that despite numerous multinational agreements and
treaties describing a right to life and health, “the court cannot conclude that the rights are
sufficiently ‘specific’ that their alleged violation states a claim under the ATCA, or that
nations universally recognize they can be violated by perpetrating environmental
harm.”85 The court also held that the principle of sustainable development was
insufficiently specific to give rise to a legal obligation.86 While the court did hold that
plaintiffs could plead a violation of the United Nations Convention on The Law of the
Sea (“UNCLOS”),87 it then dismissed this claim under the act of state doctrine—a
dismissal that was reversed by a Ninth Circuit panel,88 whose opinion was then reheard
en banc89 for a resolution of the issue of whether exhaustion of local remedies should be
demanded.90 All in all, even in the Ninth Circuit, there has hardly been any judicial
attempt to recognize—let alone develop—international environmental law under the
ATCA.
Scholars have also taken note that the narrow way in which the “law of nations” is
defined will have a profound impact on developing international environmental law
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under the ATCA. “Although Sosa did not altogether prohibit federal courts from
generating new federal law based on evolving international norms, plaintiffs face a very
heavy burden in trying to sue corporations under the ATS for violations of environmental
norms or treaties.”91 This “heavy burden”—combined with the doctrinal vagueness
imposed by Sosa—erects a significant barrier to encouraging greater CSR through the
ATCA.

IV.

OBSTACLES 2 AND 3: UNSETTLED AIDING AND ABETTING AND
STATE ACTION RULES
1.

THE DOCTRINAL DEBATE

Apart from what counts as a violation of the “law of nations” under Sosa, the
federal courts have struggled with two related questions that have a profound impact on
corporate CSR. The first question is: where the bulk or core of the allegedly wrongful
conduct was committed by a private (usually corporate) actor, how much, if any,
associated state action is required for an action to proceed against the private actor? The
second question is: where the bulk or core of the allegedly wrongful conduct was
committed by a (foreign) state actor, how much, if any, associated private corporate
action is required for an action to proceed against the private corporate actor? The first
question is typically subsumed under the label of a “state action” requirement for an
ATCA claim. The second question is typically subsumed under the question of whether
and when the ATCA allows for aiding and abetting liability.
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Figures One and Two map two possible visions of the different alternatives in
terms of the possible legal regimes and their effect in promoting corporate social
responsibility. At the far left side of the figure is a regime where the ATCA is
understood to not allow any corporate liability, and hence would have no bearing on
CSR. In both visions, the least-CSR friendly legal regimes (no corporate liability, no
aiding and abetting liability) are the same; the differences, as discussed below, relate to
the ordering of the two, relatively most-CSR legal regimes. High threshold is used as a
rough or crude way of expressing a legal threshold that would exclude some but not all
potential plaintiffs, whereas a low threshold would allow most, if not all, potential
plaintiffs to pursue claims.
FIGURE ONE
Possible ATCA
Legal Regimes

Least CSREffective

No Corporate
Liability

No Aiding And
Abetting Liability

High Threshold for
Aiding and
Abetting Liability
and for Meeting
State Action
Requirement

High Threshold for
Aiding and
Abetting Liability
but Low Threshold
for Meeting State
Action
Requirement

FIGURE TWO
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Low Threshold for
Aiding and
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Abetting Liability
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State Action
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Possible ATCA
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Most CSREffective

Low Threshold for
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Abetting Liability
and Low Threshold
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Action
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High Threshold for
Aiding and
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But Low Threshold
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Action
Requirement

The position that the ATCA should not apply at all to corporations -- the far left
position on both Figures One and Two -- builds on a Sosa-like notion that corporations
generally have not been the subject of international law. In terms of actual judicial
decisions, it is Judge Korman’s dissent in Khulumani v. Barclay International Bank that
most clearly adopts this view:
There is a significant basis for distinguishing between personal and
corporate liability. When the private actor is an individual, he is held
liable for acts which he has committed and for which he bears moral
responsibility. On the other hand, “legal entities, as legal abstractions can
neither think nor act as human beings, and what is legally ascribed to them
is the resulting harm produced by the individual conduct performed in the
name or for the benefit of those participating in them or sharing in their
benefits.”92
However, even Judge Korman acknowledged that post-apartheid international law (and
law generally) extended responsibility to corporations as well as individuals, and rejected
the distinction as largely artificial and antiquated for purposes of the imposition of
92
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liability. Judge Korman’s primary point appears to be that corporate liability should not
be retroactively applied to the era of apartheid’s founding, even though it may be applied
now. In his words, "the issue here is not whether policy considerations favor (or
disfavor) corporate responsibility for violations of international law. . . . Instead, it
involves a determination of what the law was during the relevant period.”93
Sosa specifically left open the question of corporate liability under the ATCA,94
but the argument has not been embraced by any court, and for good reason. There simply
is no principled basis for distinguishing between private non-corporate actors and private
corporate actors for purposes of the ATCA. Civil liability -- and that is what the ATCA
about -- is uncontroversially applied to corporate actors by the U.S. courts on much the
same terms it is applied to non-corporate actors. Moreover, it is clear that, from its
enactment, the ATCA was intended to apply and was applied to some private actors such
as pirates.95 It is of course true that corporations act through individuals, but these
individuals often are not subject to the personal jurisdiction of American courts and/or
lack the resources to compensate victims; thus, limiting ATCA suit to ones against the
individual corporate employees or officers responsible for corporate wrongs in effect
would render the ATCA a statute that creates rights to redress but no effective means of
achieving redress. Such a statutory reading would be directly contrary to the maxim that
legislatures should be assumed to intend that statutory language have real meaning.
Indeed, U.S. law treats corporations like other private persons even where doing so seems
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to entail an extreme anthropomorphization of the corporate "person," as in Citizens
United v. FEC,96 where the United States Supreme Court conferred on corporations as
great, or perhaps greater, rights to speech and political association via the making of
campaign contributions as private individuals.
The second-most-left box on Figures One and Two reflect an arguably more
cogent view than the one that there is no corporate liability under the ATCA -- that is, the
view that there is no aiding and abetting liability for any private actor, corporate or
otherwise, under the statute. In practice, this view would exclude liability for the large
number of cases where there is substantial involvement of some kind by state or quasistate actors or non-corporate private actors in the alleged wrongdoing. No Court of
Appeals has squarely embraced the no-aiding-and-abetting-liability position but several
prominent academics, relying in substantial part on the United States Supreme Court
decision in Central Bank of Denver v, First Interstate Bank of Denver,.97 have done so.
In Central Bank, a divided Court held that the federal securities laws do not implicitly
create private aiding and abetting liability for securities fraud, even though there is
criminal aiding and abetting liability. Jack Goldsmith, Curtis Bradley, and David Moore
have argued that the Central Bank plus Sosa framework does and should operate to
exclude liability for aiding and abetting primary violations of the ATCA. They argue
that:
As an initial matter, it is important to recall that the text of the ATS refers to torts
"committed" in violation of international law. There is no suggestion in this
language of third-party liability for those who facilitate the commission of such
torts. . . . The analysis in Sosa suggests a number of reasons why aiding and
abetting liability should not be read into the ATS. The Court repeatedly
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emphasized that, consistent with the limited nature of the ATS and the separation
of powers constraints on the federal courts, only a "modest number" of claims
could be brought under the ATS without further congressional authorization. The
Court further counseled the lower courts to exercise "great caution" in recognizing
new claims. And the Court emphasized that "innovative" interpretations should
be left to Congress. As we noted earlier, however, allowing corporate aiding and
abetting liability would significantly expand ATS litigation. It would also require
courts to exercise significant policy judgment normally reserved to the legislature,
such as fashioning the precise standards for what constitutes aiding and abetting.
For similar reasons, the Supreme Court declined to imply aiding and abetting
liability in civil cases brought under the securities fraud statute. In Central Bank
of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, the Court reasoned that allowing
aiding and abetting liability for securities fraud would expand litigation in a way
that would implicate policy tradeoffs best resolved by Congress. The Court also
reasoned that Congress's authorization of aiding and abetting liability in the
criminal context did not suggest a general acceptance of that type of liability in
the civil context. Finally, the Court noted the substantial uncertainties associated
with the standard for aiding and abetting.98

As we argue above, the Sosa case and hence Sosa framework is essentially
incoherent.99 Sosa may teach us that there should not be "too many" ATCA claims
allowed, but it is possible to translate that vague teaching into the position that generally
aiding and abetting claims should be allowed if the primary violations are well-founded
in international law or the position that there should be a reasonably high threshold for
what constitutes aiding and abetting under the ATCA or the position that Clark,
Goldsmith and Moore endorse -- that there should be no aiding and abetting liability
under the ATCA.
With respect to Central Bank, a key point is that, normatively, the decision may
well be "wrong": it was a 5-4 decision that overruled a large body of lower court
precedent and went against the prevailing recommendations of expert regulators and that
98
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has been subject to trenchant criticisms by commentators, particularly in the wake of
Enron and now Lehman Brothers and other failures of financial institutions that arguably
were aided and abetted by key private actors.100 Moreover, the very brevity of the ATCA
cited by Bradley, Goldsmith and Moore -- the fact that it is a single sentence -- suggests
that Congress intended the courts to work out the shape of ATCA liability in a common
law fashion, rather than relying on direct legislative direction (as we argue supra). That,
plus a historical context in which was aiding and abetting liability generally was
recognized and specifically discussed with respect to the ATCA -- distinguish Central
Bank, even assuming Central Bank was correctly decided. As Judge Hall explained in
his concurrence in Khulumani:
In Central Bank, the Supreme Court held that the Securities Acts of 1933 and
1934 did not encompass aiding and abetting liability. 511 U.S. at 171, 114 S.Ct.
1439. Noting that the Acts provided for some forms of “indirect” liability, the
Supreme Court reasoned that “Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting
liability when it chose to do so.” Id. at 176, 114 S.Ct. 1439. This same reasoning
cannot apply to the ATCA, whose textual brevity and dearth of legislative history
leave us with inconclusive evidence of Congress's intent to include or exclude
aiding and abetting liability. It would appear, however, that the Founding
Generation nevertheless understood the ATCA encompassed aiding and abetting
liability. For example, in Attorney General Bradford's 1795 opinion, Breach of
Neutrality, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795), he opined that the ATCA allowed civil
suits for damages for those who had “taken part” in violating international law.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 721, 124 S.Ct. 2739. In fact, Bradford's opinion specifically
covered those American citizens who “voluntarily joined, conducted, aided and
abetted ” the French fleet in their attack on a British settlement. Breach of
Neutrality, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. at 58 (emphasis added). Attorney General Bradford
furthermore referred to an April 1793 Proclamation issued by George Washington
which declared that “all those who should render themselves liable to punishment
under the laws of nations, by committing, aiding or abetting hostilities” against
the merchants of foreign nations at peace with the United States would not receive
the protection of the United States. Id. at 59. Cases from that era, moreover,
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indicate that secondary liability was recognized as an established part of the
federal common law. See Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 1 L.Ed. 540
(1795) (holding a defendant liable for aiding the unlawful capture of a neutral
ship and ordering restitution); Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1103
(C.C.D.Pa.1793) (Chief Justice John Jay) (charging a grand jury that United
States citizens may be held liable under the laws of the United States for
“committing, aiding or abetting hostilities” in violation of the law of nations); see
also Congress's Act of April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 114 (1790) (deeming “an accessory
[sic] to ... piracies” anyone who “knowingly and willingly aid[ed]” piracy).101

Moving from left to right, the next box on both Figures One and Two reflect what
might be thought of as a near no-win-ever position for plaintiffs seeking to sue
corporations under the ATCA. There is a kind of “catch-22” inherent in any legal regime
that sets a high or demanding threshold for meeting both the state action and aiding and
abetting requirements. If the bar is set high for state action, and that high threshold is met
in a particular case by implication, then by implication, private actors will have had a
relatively modest or attenuated role in the allegedly wrongful conduct. Thus, it will be
something between difficult and impossible for plaintiffs to meet a high or demanding
threshold for aiding and abetting liability. Conversely, if the bar is set high for aiding and
abetting then, by implication, private actors will have had a very substantial and perhaps
central role in the allegedly wrongful conduct. Thus it will be very difficult for a plaintiff
to meet a high or demanding threshold for state action. Where the private corporate and
state actors operate absolutely in tandem, sharing equally in the wrongful conduct, this
catch-22 would be avoided; indeed, in such a case, both the private and state actors could
be considered primary violators of the ATCA, so aiding and abetting as a legal category
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would be irrelevant. But such cases presumably are and will be rare, if there are any such
cases at all.
When we move to two boxes farthest to the right side of Figures One and Two,
there are differences in ordering. Figure One offers what we would take to be the most
intuitive ordering -- one in which the "best" position from a CSR perspective would be
one in which there is both a low threshold for aiding and abetting and for state action, as
the barriers to suits against corporations then would be minimized. Figure Two reflect
what we believe to be the correct ordering, if not the immediately intuitive one -- that is,
one in which the most CSR-effective regime marries a high threshold for aiding and
abetting with a low threshold for meeting the state action requirement. In the sections
below, we explain why a low threshold for the state action requirement is always
desirable but it is at least contestable whether a low threshold for aiding and abetting
liability best advances the goals of CSR.

2.

THE CASE FOR A PURPOSIVE ACTION REQUIREMENT FOR
AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY

The courts have articulated at least two distinct versions of the aiding and abetting
requirement for ATCA liability. In the first version, which we call the "knowledge test,"
a corporate party may be deemed to have aided and abetted a violation of the ATCA if it
knowingly provided substantial assistance to the violator. In the second version, which
we call the purpose test, a corporate party may be deemed to have aided and abetted a
violation of the ATCA if it provided substantial assistance to the violator with the intent
or purpose of furthering the committing of the violation itself. In the framework of

Figures One and Two, the knowledge test is the low threshold for aiding and abetting
liability, and the purpose test is the high threshold for aiding and abetting liability.
The knowledge test has been formulated as [i] knowing [ii] encouragement [iii]
that facilitated the substantive violation."102 The purpose test has been formulated as
providing that a “a defendant may be held liable under international law for aiding and
abetting the violation of that law by another when the defendant (1) provides practical
assistance to the principal which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime,
and (2) does so with the purpose of facilitating the commission of that crime.”103

While

it would certainly be semantically plausible to conflate the tests and argue that someone
who does something knowing it will help a certain action takes places thereby acts with
the purpose of facilitating the action, the knowledge/purpose dichotomy captures a real,
intuitive difference -- the difference between a corporation that does not specifically
intend to assist (for example) mass poisoning or torture as such but knows that it is
financially assisting a state actor that may in fact decide to commit the mass poisoning or
torture, and the corporation that specifically intends -- specifically wants -- the state actor
to use the assistance to commit mass poisoning or torture.
Various court opinions suggest that, as a doctrinal matter, the choice between the
knowledge and purpose tests depends on the choice of the source of law to be used for
the determination of what constitutes the threshold for aiding and abetting liability. Two
notable opinions in this regard are Judge Hall's and Judge Katzmann's concurrences in
Khulumani. The crux of the consolidated lawsuits at issue in Khulumani was that fifty
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U.S. and foreign corporations had aided and abetted atrocities committed by the South
African government during apartheid (from 1948 until 1991) by providing oil, technology
and capital to the South African government, which then used the resources in part to
further its policies of oppression and persecution of the African majority.104 The Second
Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the aiding and abetting claims, but the
two judges voting for the reversal differed as to the source of law the judge believed to be
the source of the applicable aiding and abetting standard. Judge Katzmann argued that
international law provides the basis for any aiding and abetting standards, and that
international law dictated a purpose test, not a knowledge test.105 By contrast, Judge Hall
argued that domestic law -- in effect, federal common law -- determined the standard for
aiding and abetting liability and that, under section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, the knowledge test was the correct tests for the aiding and abetting of alleged
ATCA violations.106 Similarly, when the Second Circuit subsequently established the
purpose test as the definitive test within the Circuit, the Court tied its decision to its
choice of international law as the appropriate source for the standard for the aiding and
abetting of ATCA violations.107
It would not seem to make much sense, however, to tie the choice of aiding and
abetting standard to the choice of the source of law. For one thing, both the federal
common law and international law -- and especially customary international law -- are
amorphous enough that one probably could find a range of standards dictated by either of
104
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them; ask any law student (or lawyer) and they will readily tell you they cannot describe
the content of either with any specificity. Moreover, to make matters even more
confusing, one could plausibly argue that international law is a legitimate source for a
court to look to in making a decision under federal common law.
From a normative perspective, one might want to choose between the knowledge
and the purpose test by asking which test would better advance CSR goals. Assuming
that is the relevant normative framework (as we do here), it might at first seem that the
knowledge test would be better than the purpose test. Under a knowledge test, more
corporations in more settings would be exposed to possible liability (and the disclosures
attendant litigation) than would be the case under the more demanding purpose test.
Even in a knowledge test regime, corporations of course could go out of their way not to
know what state and other actors do, but it might be difficult for them to deny knowledge,
and courts might well treat intentional refusal to learn of certain activities by the relevant
state or non-corporate actor as equivalent to knowledge. In effect, a knowledge test
means that a corporation cannot stay out of court by simply saying that they were just
doing business and did not want (for example) government agents to dump waste or burn
villages or kill environmental activists but rather simply wanted to peacefully proceed
with our oil field development.
The knowledge test, however, may be less effective in promoting CSR precisely
because it would make ATCA suits too easy to file and pursue. It would be too potent.
A wide range of corporations doing business in certain countries where human rights and
environmental abuses are commonplace would be exposed to possible suit. Indeed, in
many cases, corporations may feel that there would be no way they could do business in

certain countries without exposing themselves to ATCA claims. As a result, they may
feel that there is no advantage in taking actions to avoid ATCA liability -- action such as
encouraging state and non-state actors with whom they work to engage in more humane
and/or environmentally sound practices than they otherwise might choose.
The large number of suits that a knowledge test might well make possible also
may have the effect of dampening the strength of the signal an ATCA suit can send to the
constituencies upon which the CSR movement relies for its impact -- namely,
shareholders, investors in social responsibility funds, and consumers.108 Where the
standard for aiding and abetting liability is so broad that it does not exclude corporations
that (relatively speaking) try to discourage abusive behavior by affiliated state or other
actors and throes such companies into the same cauldron of shame as companies that
happily accept or actively encourage the most horrendous behavior, then the fact of an
ATCA suit and litigation might not communicate that much information to the relevant
CSR constituencies about any given corporation in particular. The impact of ATCA
litigation thus would be lessened, and in turn, the ex ante incentives of corporations to
take measures to avoid possible ATCA litigation and liability would be further reduced.
The facts in the Second Circuit case of Presbyterian Church illustrate this point
well. In that case, the core allegations were that an oil company aided and abetted human
rights abuses by the government of Sudan, including abuses associated with the forced
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There is of course the danger that plaintiffs will simply allege the defendant
corporation acted purposefully even when there is no direct or even strong indirect
evidence known to them that is true or even where they suspect or know that not to be
true. And the filing of a lawsuit, by itself, can be costly for a defendant corporation. But
the federal district courts, particularly in light of the recent tightening of pleading
standards by the United States Supreme Court, should be able to manage the dismissal of
these cases.

clearing of the population near areas of oil exploration and development. The
corporation emphasized that it had repeatedly urged the Sudanese military not to engage
in human rights abuses. As the Second Circuit suggested, the corporation's efforts
actually worsened their legal position under a knowledge test while aiding their legal
position under a purpose test:
The reports that plaintiffs rely upon to prove knowledge also show that Greater
Nile security personnel and GNPOC workers were upset by the Government's
actions and possible attacks on civilians. For example, several reports address the
company's efforts to relive the plight of internally displaced persons, which
included stockpiling tons of relief supplies and distributing food, water, medicine,
and mosquito nets.109

There is of course a risk that under a purpose test regime, corporations will try to
ATCA-proof themselves by making minimal efforts to protest or mitigate wrongdoing by
state actors or non-state actors with whom they are affiliated in a foreign country. But
minimal efforts may be better than no efforts -- which could well be the product of a
knowledge regime -- and plaintiffs could allege and seek to prove that the protest or
mitigation efforts were simply a sham and that the corporation intended to aid the
wrongdoing. It might well be hard for plaintiffs to make such a showing as an
evidentiary matter, but as long as they had some basis for alleging the corporation acted
with the requisite (bad) purpose, the plaintiffs would at least have the opportunity to seek
discovery and possibly bring the corporation's true motivations to light.
The final problem with the knowledge test relates to a final important
constituency -- the federal courts themselves. The federal courts have a range of ways of
avoiding ATCA suits that have nothing to do with the standard for an actionable violation
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under Sosa, the standard for aiding and abetting, or the state action requirement: these
include evocation of the political question doctrine, a stringent application of personal
jurisdiction requirements, and perhaps, above all, the flexible doctrine of forum non
conveniens.110 A test that makes aiding and abetting cases too easy to plead adequately
under the ATCA may produce an indiscriminate backlash on the part of the courts, in
which the courts simply shut the doors to ATCA litigation using the range of tools
available to them to do so,

3.

THE CASE FOR NO STATE ACTION REQUIREMENT OR A
LOW-THRESHOLD STATE ACTION REQUIREMENT

The aiding and abetting threshold for ATCA liability and the state action
requirement, while clearly related, are not quite mirror images of each other. First, the
courts sometimes do not require any state action at all in order to find private parties
liable under the ATCA. Second, even within non-CSR normative considerations, there is
a very good case that state action never should be a pre-condition for the imposition of
liability. Finally, from a CSR perspective, the state action requirement that would be
most effective is no requirement at all or at least a low threshold requirement (i.e., that
the foreign state actors in question merely knew or constructively should be charged with
knowledge of the allegedly wrongful conduct committed by the private corporate
defendant). For these reasons, we embrace the position adopted by the Second Circuit in
Abdullahi v Pfizer, Inc,111 which seems to be that where a private corporate actor violates
an international norm through a corporate activity (such as medical testing without the
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permission of the test subjects), either no state action or only minimal state action is
required for the ATCA suit to proceed to proceed against the private corporate actor.
It is not straightforward to explain what the current state of federal law is
regarding the state action requirement for ATCA claims. There seems to be reasonably
broad consensus that certain kinds of conduct trigger ATCA liability even in the absence
of any significant state action or at least any significant, knowing or purposeful state
action. Thus, even the Chamber of Commerce, a strong critic of ATCA litigation, seems
to recognize that the ATCA applies to purely private action with respect to "war crimes,
genocide, the slave trade, airplane hijacking, and piracy."112 The Second Circuit in
Pfizer, drawing upon Section 1983's expansive "under of color of law" test and
jurisprudence, does not seem to require that the state actor knew what was wrongful and
hence illegal about the private corporation's conduct before it happened.113 By contrast,
"the Eleventh Circuit requires that the foreign government know of the specific wrongful
112
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conduct alleged to violate international law, and the Ninth Circuit requires a state plan or
policy to commit that conduct."114
There is no clear normative case for requiring knowing or intentional state
assistance or a state policy in support of private wrongdoing in order for liability to be
imposed on private corporations. It may well be true that, historically, international law
has mostly been applied to states, but it has not always so applied and, moreover,
international law has and presumably should evolve.115 Moreover, a number of the
powerful normative considerations that argue in favor of the Sosa position of caution in
extending the scope of jurisdiction of the ATCA argue are largely inapplicable where
almost all the relevant or all the relevant conduct and intent was that of a private
corporation. The more a state actor is involved in a given case, and the more it is it
involved as a purposeful actor, the more a court's exercise of jurisdiction would seem to
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Such evolution is also consistent with the notion that the ATCA covers the “law of
nations” (not simply international law), which grew out of a natural law/common law
tradition, as we argue supra.

raise possibly difficult questions of international comity and deference to the Executive
as the branch of government with principal responsibility over foreign affairs.
Conversely, the less a state actor is involved in a given case, and the less its involvement,
if any, was purposeful vis-à-vis the alleged wrongdoing, the less a court's exercise of
jurisdiction would seem to raise possibly difficult questions of international comity and
deference to the Executive as the branch of government with principal responsibility over
foreign affairs.
From the vantage of CSR, no state action or a minimal state action requirement
would also seem to be normatively correct. A corporation that undertakes wrongdoing
without any participation of state actors or passive participation at best would seem to be
more culpable than a corporation that has a modest and grudging role in committing
wrongs in concert with state actors who intentionally, insistently undertake the
wrongdoing.116 Certainly the key CSR stakeholders of consumers, shareholders and
socially-responsible funds would be just as interested in -- and one would think, more
interested -- in learning about the former situations than the latter, and ATCA litigation
would be one means by which they could become informed. Indeed, it is precisely where
there is no or minimal state involvement that the choice made by corporate actors -- the
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State courts in California have recognized that California as a forum has a strong
interest in ensuring that California corporations are acting responsibly, even outside U.S.
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in the United States involving torts committed in foreign countries it may well be
preferable to have the suits hear by the federal rather than the state, courts.

very thing the CSR "movement" seeks to influence -- might make a difference in terms of
whether abuses to human rights and the environment happen or not. Finally, unlike a
minimal aiding and abetting standard, a minimal state action standard is very unlikely to
result in an onslaught of cases (nor result in the downside of such an onslaught, as
discussed infra) because in most of the developing countries at issue, private corporate
actors usually cannot engage in the kinds of conduct the ATCA is likely to make
actionable without at least some knowing cooperation and involvement of state actors.
State action is now -- and likely to continue to be -- -- less often a possible issue of
contest in ATCA litigation, simply because the scenario of state actors being deeply
involved in alleged wrongdoing is more common than the scenario or state actors not
being or only being minimally involved.117
V.

CONCLUSION
In sum, we conclude that the ATCA could be a powerful tool to promote

corporate CSR, especially in developing countries where local legal restraints are weak.
But despite the good normative reasons why the ATCA should be used in this way,
serious obstacles remain. The Supreme Court’s ahistorical and incoherent formulation of
the “law of nations” fails to promote the development of the ATCA in ways that would
cover even serious environmental harm. Also, the federal courts’ confused jurisprudence
concerning aiding and abetting and state action creates too many loopholes through
which egregious corporate behavior may slip unpunished. In order to overcome these
obstacles, we argue that the “law of nations” should not be read so restrictively, that a
“purposive” aiding and abetting standard should be adopted, and that the requirement of
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state action be minimized or eliminated altogether. These steps would go a long way
toward promoting the very CSR considerations that many corporations involved in
ATCA litigation have already espoused.118
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We are not asserting that the ATCA is necessarily the only or even the best means of
promoting adherence to CSR by multinational corporations operating in countries with
undeveloped or unreliable systems of tort compensation. It may well be that an
international treaty among nations with the creation of reporting and compensation
requirements could be better tailored to the objectives of encouraging responsible
investment and due consideration to the wide range of differences among countries and
populations. But there are no such treaties in the horizon and the development of ATCA
liability for environmental harms, even if only in the most catastrophic cases, is more
likely to encourage multinational corporations to support the development of treaty law
than would the absence of any realistic threat of ATCA liability.

